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I.
Introduction
The phrase “environmental refugee” summons a compelling
image of someone forced to relocate due to climate change. The
phrase has been used effectively to raise awareness of such diverse
problems as the rising sea levels that are submerging some Pacific
islands,1 as well as the increased impact of natural disasters like
hurricanes and earthquakes which cause a mixture of temporary and

† Elizabeth Keyes, Assistant Professor, Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic,
University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, M.P.A.
Princeton University, B.A. Carleton College. Thanks to Deborah Weissman and Lenore
Livingston at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for this opportunity.
1 See, e.g., Trevelyan Wing, Submerging Paradise: Climate Change in the Pacific
Islands, CLIMATE INST. (Dec. 28, 2017), http://climate.org/submerging-paradise-climatechange-in-the-pacific-islands/ [https://perma.cc/Y674-QXHA].
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permanent migration.2 As climate change accelerates, and its
human costs become ever clearer, it is completely appropriate and
necessary to respond to these migrations, and a number of
international initiatives are underway to do so.
As these initiatives go forward, however, it will be increasingly
important to be careful and precise about the phrase “environmental
refugee.” First, as a legal term, the phrase is dubious. It implicitly
harnesses the language, norms, and protections of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention),3 which fits only a small subset of climate change
migrants. Second, at a time when the Refugee Convention itself is
under enormous strain, the phrase, with its expansive umbrella of
applicability, is also problematic from a policy standpoint.
Regional refugee instruments are often broader than the Refugee
Convention itself,4 but the Convention is the particular focus of this
Article.
This Article begins with an assessment of the circumstances in
which the word “refugee” is appropriate for climate change
migrants and demonstrates that while the Convention can and will
2 See generally, e.g., Sarah Opitz Stapleton et al., Climate Change, Migration, and
Displacement, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. & U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (Nov. 2017) (examining
the links between human mobility and climate change).
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 62, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
4 For example, the African Union Refugee Convention (“AURC”) includes
protection for those affected by “events seriously disturbing public order”—a broader
framework than the individualized approach taken by the UN Refugee Convention. Cf.
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2) (listing circumstances when an
individual can be considered a refugee). A case study of Somali migration to Kenya shows
how the AURC helped provide a framework for Kenya’s response. See Sanjula
Weerasinghe (UNHCR Consultant), In Harm’s Way: International Protection in the
Context of Nexus Dynamics between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change,
UNHCR
DIVISION
OF
INT’L
PROTECTION
at
11
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX7M-GBY4]. Likewise, the
Cartagena Declaration encompasses “other circumstances which have seriously disturbed
public order.” Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984,
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html [https://perma.cc/3T8B8DXG]. Mexico incorporated that broader definition into its domestic law, and the
framework partly guided the country’s response to Haitian migration after the devastating
2010 earthquake. See Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 66 (citing Ley de Migración [LM],
No. 9.474, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 22-07-1997 (Mex.) (English translation
available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f4dfb134.pdf)).
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cover individuals in some limited settings, it will be utterly
inadequate to protect the broader range of populations needing to
migrate. Having established these limitations, the Article then
considers the costs of using the word in other contexts. Those costs
include the diversion of resources into the project of expanding the
Convention, through the slow and arduous work of developing new
precedents and understandings to protect climate change. There is
also a great risk of weakening the international system’s support for
the Convention itself as it stretches to address problems for which
it was never designed. The Article ends with a justification for a
complementary protection regime, and a brief examination of what
such a regime might look like.
II. What’s in a Name?
When we consider the impact of climate change on migration,
it is clear that the impact spans a broad array of migration choices
and realities. It encompasses voluntary and involuntary movement
and migrations within and across borders.5 It includes the wealthy
family selling frequently flooded property in South Carolina to
move away from the coast, and the poor family who has to abandon
land that is no longer arable in Niger and move to the capital in
search of a livelihood. It includes people for whom the harms are
in the distant future, and those for whom climate change has already
destroyed their communities or livelihoods.
Global migration scholar Susan Martin has written a
comprehensive study of the migration trends related to climate
change and has laid out existing and inchoate policy responses to
the same in her 2017 article Environmental Change and Human
Mobility: Trends, Law and Policy.6 In it, Professor Martin creates
a helpful typology that looks at migration, displacement, and
planned relocation as distinct phenomena, each of which needs a
specific set of international policy responses.7 Within migration,
she considers various drivers: (1) long-term trends like drought
(where the land is so degraded it ceases to be livable) and rising sea

5 See Stapleton, supra note 2, at 6 (defining terminology related to migration within
the climate change context).
6 Susan Martin, Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Trends, Law and
Policy, 42 COMP. POPULATION STUDIES 187 (2017).
7 Id. at 189.
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levels (where the land ceases to be available at all);8 (2) more
frequent and intense natural disasters, which might lead to both
temporary and permanent decisions to migrate;9 and (3) political
upheavals connected to the environment.10
Each of these drivers merits careful inquiry as we consider
whether and how climate change migrants might be considered
refugees. The Convention definition of a refugee requires not just
that people face severe harm, but that the harm is happening because
of a protected characteristic: race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.11 This nexus
between the harm and the protected characteristic is where a casual
use of the term “environmental refugee” reveals its imprecision. As
Professor Ramji-Nogales has noted (in discussing the binary
between “economic migrants” and “asylum-seekers”), “[t]here are
many compelling drivers of migration that do not fall within the
narrow international legal definition of a refugee.”12 I have
previously written about such non-binary migrants as being
“unconventional” refugees and argued, as I will here, that it is better
to find legal protections and policy solutions that fit these new
situations instead of trying to stretch an already stressed Convention
to a breaking point.13
Id. at 191.
9 Id. at 195–96.
10 Id. at 196–202.
11 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2). Convention drafters intended
that this definition be quite narrow: the narrow availability of asylum was by design. See
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 145 (1990). The states drafting the convention needed to balance
protection with pressures for restriction. Id. As James Hathaway writes:
The subjectivity of the refugee definition has provided a means of legitimating
this restrictionist tendency: the strong political and economic links that exist
between the West and many Third World states of origin have led to a
predisposition to question the likelihood that those states could reasonably be
expected to engage in persecutory behavior. . . . As a result, the persecutionbased standard now poses a major political impediment to the recognition of
large numbers of refugee claims, humanitarian or human rights concerns
notwithstanding.
Id. at 169–70.
12 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 (2017).
13 See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional Refugees, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 89
(2017) (arguing that improving conditions in home countries could be part of a long-term
strategy towards root causes while a temporary protection regime might be a short-term
and inadequate solution).
8
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Consider the first driver: long-term environmental trends.
When the Pacific Ocean finally submerges the island of Kirabati,14
we can imagine its last residents in boats literally seeking a safe
shore, with incalculable harm done to their well-being in every
respect. But who is the agent persecuting the people of Kirabati?
Under the Refugee Convention, it needs to be either the government
itself, or a private entity the government is unable or unwilling to
control.15 Neither applies to the Kirabati situation, where the
government itself is a victim of a crime for whom culpability is
highly indirect and attributable to a broad swath of nation-states and
corporations.16 Even if we posit that those nation-states and
corporations constitute entities that the Kirabati government is
unable to control,17 those entities are not motivated to harm the
people of Kirabati because of their nationality, race, or other
protected characteristics. Indeed, a piece of the harm done to
Kirabati is the sheer lack of consideration it is not motivated by
hatred but by cruel indifference.
By contrast, the third-driver, political upheaval, offers more
obvious possibilities for application of the Convention. Martin
writes that:
Competition over natural resources may exacerbate pressures
contributing to conflict, which in turn precipitates movements of
people. Prolonged drought appears to have exacerbated tensions
in Syria, contributing to the 2011 demonstrations against the
Assad regime, which in turn led to the protracted conflict that has
displaced millions of people.18

Similarly, scholars of the Rwandan genocide have noted how
environmental pressure contributed to the population’s
susceptibility to anti-Tutsi propaganda,19 leading to persecution on
14 See, e.g., Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-changekiribati.html [https://perma.cc/3P5F-PD5W].
15 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2).
16 See Ives, supra note 14.
17 Id.
18 Martin, supra note 6, at 191 (internal citations omitted).
19 William B. Wood, Geographic Aspects of Genocide: A Comparison of Bosnia and
Rwanda, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 57, 64 (2001) (“In an
impoverished ‘ethnocratic’ state like Rwanda, ‘ethnicity is also the ruling principle of
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account of race—persecution that fit within the Refugee
Convention.20 Drought in the Darfur region of Sudan likewise
created intense competition for resources that led to the deaths of
countless Sudanese Christians on account of an interrelated mix of
political opinions, religion, and race.21 These latter examples tie
climate change more closely to harms traditionally understood to
fall within the ambit of the Refugee Convention if not quite directly.
In between these two examples are subtler situations. Thinking
again about Kiribati, while the entire island will be lost in the longterm,22 in the immediate future, the costs of climate change are born
unevenly across the population. Unsurprisingly, the costs are born
by the more economically vulnerable members of the population
across the world. From Kirabati to New Orleans, poorer
communities live most immediately with environmental destruction
or on land at greatest risk for natural disasters.23
These diverging examples show the necessity of fine-tuning
how and when we believe that the Refugee Convention can apply to
climate-driven migration. This Article will offer perspectives on
how and when the Convention might apply, even to migration
driven by long-term trends. There is an obvious importance to
ensuring that some number of climate-change migrants benefit from
Convention protection when such protection is legally appropriate.
After detailing that appropriateness, the Article turns briefly to the
issue of how an overbroad misuse of the word “refugee” may hurt
the protection scheme overall. Finally, the Article considers the
alternatives to the Refugee Convention framework for addressing
economic and social differentiation,’ with ethnic groups then forced to ‘confront each other
in the process of competition for material and social resources’”) (quoting J. Markakis,
Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa, in ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE
HORN OF AFRICA 217, 236 (1993))).
20 See id.
21 See Julian Borger, Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate
Change,
U.N.
Report
Warns,
GUARDIAN
(June
23,
2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange
[https://perma.cc/P47Z-TYFU].
22 See Ben Doherty, ‘Our Country Will Vanish’: Pacific Islanders Bring Desperate
Message
to
Australia,
GUARDIAN
(May
13,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/our-country-will-vanish-pacificislanders-bring-desperate-message-to-australia [https://perma.cc/VBQ6-6YNV].
23 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change: The Poor Will Suffer Most, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/climatechange-poor-suffer-most-un-report [https://perma.cc/G5Q7-NAH8].
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climate-related forced migration.
III. Identifying Climate-Change Refugees
The Refugee Convention will be insufficient to meet the
migration needs of all climate-change migrants, but it would be an
oversimplification to dismiss the Convention and its possibilities
out of hand. As Sanjula Weerasinghe notes in an important
UNHCR study of state responses to disaster and climate change,
Sometimes, popular perceptions and narratives on the ‘causes’
prompting flight may lead to the disregard of refugee law
frameworks. This may be more likely when prominent or
proximate triggers relate to root causes, which are not regarded as
traditional causes of refugee flight. In this context, ensuring
refugee law frameworks remain within a ‘toolbox’ of responses
to address cross-border movement in the context of nexus
dynamics may be a key policy challenge.24

In this section, I will look at a few of the interlocking pieces of the
refugee definition25 to see whether and how climate change migrants
can benefit from the Convention’s protections. As the final section
of this Article will contend, we must look beyond the Convention
for protection that will meet the broad demands of climate-change
migration, but it is clear that in some specific subset of
circumstances, the Convention will be an important tool.
A. Persecution: Direct Environmental Harm and Indirect
Other Forms of Harm
To merit Convention protection, the harm an individual is
fleeing must constitute “persecution.”26 As the UNHCR Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(“UNHCR Handbook”)27 notes, “[t]here is no universally accepted

Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 11.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at 14.
26 UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 ¶ 36 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR
HANDBOOK].
27 Id. at ¶ 51.
24
25
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definition of ‘persecution.’”28 Persecution encompasses threats to
life or freedom, and has been found in such harms as rape, beatings,
attempted murder, and threats of these things, among many other
serious harms.29 Persecution is also inextricably linked to the
motivation for the actions. Some acts that may be persecution in
one context might not be in another, specifically where those actions
are not motivated by animus or—in language that has evolved
through U.S. case law—a desire to overcome a characteristic
deemed “offensive.”30
Highly relevant to climate-change refugees is whether and when
discrimination fits under the umbrella of persecution. The UNHCR
Handbook states, “[w]here measures of discrimination are, in
themselves, not of a serious character, they may nevertheless give
rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind
of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as
regards his future existence.”31 Government actions and inactions
on climate often affect different sub-groups of the country
differently and are classic examples of discrimination; such
discrimination might rise to the level of persecution if it means
members of those sub-groups are reasonably fearful for their future
existence.32
The critical piece for whether such fears constitutes persecution
is whether there is an intentionality to the government’s actions or
inactions.33 As Professor Gaim Kibraeb states, “[t]he only time
environmentally-induced displacees may be regarded as ‘refugees’
is when the state uses environment as an instrument of political
oppression. This requirement exists because at the heart of the
notion of persecution lies state failure to provide protection.”34
Even within this concept of protection, there is a spectrum of
governmental culpability. At one end of the spectrum, we can

Id.
Jose H. Fischel De Andrade, On the Development of the Concept of ‘Persecution’
in International Refugee Law, 2 III ANUARIO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 114,
127–28 (1996).
30 See Pitcherskaia v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997).
31 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at ¶ 55 (emphasis added).
32 See Gaim Kibreab, Climate Change and Human Migration: A Tenuous
Relationship?, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 357, 393 (2009).
33 See id. at 385.
34 Id.
28
29
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imagine a country where the government forces certain sub-groups
to bear the brunt of the environmental harm (leaving them in lowlying, flood-prone areas while other groups are moved to higher
ground).35 Such discrimination lies at the heart of a refugee claim
from Kiribati, which failed on other grounds.36 It is also a cousin to
the kind of discrimination that we see throughout the United States,
from Hurricane Katrina, where structural racism led to a highly
disparate impact on New Orleans’ African-American community,37
to the shores of Alaska where Native Alaskans are struggling with
little support from the government to save their communities.38 At
the other end of the spectrum might be a country like Tuvalu, where
the whole population faces a similar risk, caused by distant forces
and not by the government itself.39
Much environmental harm is not a villain-less phenomenon. As
Geographer William Wood has written,
Forced ecomigration may be defined as a type of migration that is
propelled by economic decline and environmental degradation.
Groups unable to sustain themselves at a minimal level face a

35 See Shabnam Dastgheib, Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Told He Must Leave
New
Zealand,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/22/kiribati-climate-change-refugeetold-he-must-leave-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/WQH8-E2PX].
36 See id.
37 See Kibreab, supra note 32, at 390 (highlighting the temporary displacement of
over a million people after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast in August 2005).
38 See FACING THE STORM: INDIAN TRIBES, CLIMATE-INDUCED WEATHER EXTREMES,
AND THE FUTURE FOR INDIAN COUNTRY, CONFRONTING GLOBAL WARMING REPORT 19
(Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n ed., 2011) (“Compared to state and local governments, Tribes
receive much less federal funding and other resources to deal with these [environmental]
issues. Within federal funding streams, Tribes are either expressly excluded, not
mentioned at all, or are ineligible for other reasons, leaving a gap that they are unable to
fill. When the federal government does allocate funding to Tribes, it is often a very small
percentage compared to funds allocated to other entities.”).
39 Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu Disappear under the Sea?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug.
2004), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/will-tuvalu-disappear-beneaththe-sea-180940704/ [https://perma.cc/CK3C-DS35] (“Unlike other current or predicted
environmental catastrophes, Tuvalu’s problem is one that people worldwide are believed
to create by burning fossil fuels that release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere,
contributing to global warming. In that sense, my habit of leaving lights on around my
house, in Washington, D.C., a neighbor’s of constantly driving his large SUV to go just a
few city blocks and another neighbor’s preference for a toasty house in winter would play
a role in Tuvalu’s fate.”).
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crisis that is both ecological and economic. Forced ecomigrations
result when those conditions become immediately lifethreatening . . . inequitable access to arable land is as much a
social problem as an environmental one.40

Extreme environmental harms that threaten the existence of subgroups of a nation could constitute persecution when the
government’s policies are explicitly directed at and against those
sub-groups. As Professor Kibraeb writes,
This sub-category [of true ‘environmental refugees’] includes
people who are victimized by an explicit ‘ecocidal’ policies or
activities of oppressive regimes. The Marsh Arabs in southern
Iraq or refugees whose repatriation opportunities are stifled by the
littering of their homelands with landmines or destruction of
infrastructure by combatants or government forces . . . . The
question to ask however is why the Marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq
cannot be considered political refugees rather than
‘environmental refugees.’41

I contend that this understanding of persecution is both too broad
and too narrow. It is too broad because it encapsulates “state failure
to provide protection”42 that might not be motivated by any
impermissible animus. In Haiti, for example, deforestation has
made much of the land unlivable, but the government’s failure to
offer protection against these environmental harms appears not to
be linked to ethnic or political animus, and extends generally across
the population.43 While the devastation might be comparable to that
40 William B. Wood, Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International
Dilemmas, 84 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 607, 617–18 (1994) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
41 Kibreab, supra note 32, at 386. Hussein drained the land that was home to the
Marsh Arab Shia population under the pretext of “an agricultural improvement plan which
[would] benefit the people of the region.” Michael Wood, Saddam Drains the Life of the
Marsh
Arabs
of
Southern
Iraq,
INDEP.
(Aug.
28,
1993),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saddam-drains-the-life-of-the-marsh-arabsthe-arabs-of-southern-iraq-cannot-endure-their-villages-1463823.html
[https://perma.cc/AP5Z-AYDB].
42 Id. at 385.
43 William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages Between Environmental Change and
Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 42, 55
(Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001) (“Haiti’s alarming levels of land
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resulting from intentional ecocidal policies,44 the lack of persecutory
motivation removes it from the ambit of the Convention’s
protections.
However, the understanding is also too narrow. As we consider
how these sub-groups might adapt to climate change through
(perhaps as a first effort) internal migration, we can unfortunately
envision other forms of harm resulting from the vulnerabilities
inherent to being forced internal migrants: women and sexual
minorities settling in urban areas where they face intensified risks
of gender-based violence,45 or children sent to earn a living in an
urban area where they face the predations of organized crime.46 In
these scenarios, the persecution is not directly related to climate
change itself, but climate change creates the migrations which lead
to new vulnerabilities to persecution.47
B. Protected Characteristics and Nexus
A second set of issues arises when we consider what protected
characteristics might be at stake. The Convention requires that
persecution be on account of one of five protected characteristics:
race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a

degradation, exacerbated by decades of misguided agrarian policies, is intertwined with
desperate living conditions in rural areas and is a major factor in rural to urban migration
and even emigration from Haiti’s shores. Haiti’s over six million people have endured
successive generations of intensifying poverty, soil erosion, deforestation, and shrinking
average farm sizes, leaving many peasant families unable to meet bare subsistence
levels.”).
44 Kibreab, supra note 32, at 385.
45 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on Int’l Prot.: GenderRelated Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 3, U.N. DOC. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7,
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] (“Gender-related claims have typically
encompassed, although are by no means limited to, acts of sexual violence,
family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment
for transgression of social mores, and discrimination against homosexuals.”).
46 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized
Crime, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2010) (“Some gangs, such as the Maras, rely heavily on forced
recruitment to expand and maintain their membership. They typically recruit young people
who are poor, homeless and from marginalized segments of society or particular
neighborhoods.”).
47 See UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and
Internally Displaced Persons, Guidelines for Prevention & Response, at 111 (May 2003)
(noting that even “[a]dopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951 Convention
does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to refugee status”).
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particular social group.48 While it is difficult to disaggregate a
protected characteristic from the element of nexus, the following
sections briefly attempt this to show that protected characteristics
are likely to be found in climate change migration, but that nexus is
a harder element to meet.
1. Where the Case Is Easily Made: Political Opinion
It is evident in many migrations forced by climate-change that
different protected characteristics are or could be implicated.
Briefly, climate change will likely give rise to new political groups
and dynamics and, therefore, to political opinions opposed to the
direct and indirect government policies and actions on climatechange. For example, someone might oppose a government that
refused to take any adaptive actions, or one that took actions whose
costs were borne disproportionately by one or more sub-groups of
the population. Additionally, a new party might arise with a
climate-change focus, and its members be perceived as threatening
to the ruling party.
In these ways, climate change does not differ at all from political
opinion claims that arise from a host of other issues already seen as
cognizable under the Convention.49 An activist or party member
motivated by a climate-change issue, who fears persecutory
retaliation from the government because of their political opinions,
presents a straightforward application of the Refugee Convention.50
48 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(A)(2) (“As a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”).
49 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at ¶ 75 (“The co-existence within the
boundaries of a State of two or more national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create
situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may not always be easy to distinguish
between persecution for reasons of nationality and persecution for reasons of political
opinion when a conflict between national groups is combined with political movements,
particularly where a political movement is identified with a specific ‘nationality.’”)
(emphasis added).
50 See id. ¶ 66 (“In order to be considered a refugee, a person must show well-founded
fear of persecution for one of the reasons [race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular group or political opinion] stated above. It is immaterial whether the persecution
arises from any single one of these reasons or from a combination of two or more of them.
Often the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared. It
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2. Where the Case is More Attenuated: Race and
Membership in a Particular Social Group
Other protected grounds raise interesting possibilities, but may
encounter a nexus problem when trying to fit under the Convention.
We can imagine, for example, racial sub-groups being harmed in
particular and uneven ways by climate change. Likewise, particular
social groups—including such groups as women—may endure
special kinds of harms, distinct from the general population.
Claims based upon membership in a particular social group will
confront the necessity that any such group be centered on an innate
or immutable characteristic and that the group not be defined by the
harm itself.51 As we consider sub-populations affected by climate
change, we can imagine a strong social identity building among
those most affected—but a group defined by that affinity is defined
by the very harm the group fears.52 Likewise, communities in lowlying areas or increasingly arid areas may not be centered on an
immutable characteristic as property ownership and economic
circumstances are often (perhaps incorrectly, but jurisprudentially)
considered changeable: people can sell land and move, and people’s
economic fortunes can rise and fall.53 There will certainly be ways
to formulate particular social groups that do meet the Convention’s
requirements; if climate change affects women more than men, then
is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in
detail.”).
51 See id. ¶ 77 (explaining that refugee status based on a particular social group
“normally comprises persons of a similar background, habits, or social status” and
therefore is centered on an innate or immutable characteristic).
52 See UNHCR, The Environment & Climate Change: The Nansen Initiative – A
‘Protection Agenda’ For Cross-Border Disaster Displacement, ¶ 2.2 (Oct. 2015) (“Those
who cross borders in the context of climate change and disasters would not normally
qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The 1951
Refugee Convention speaks in terms of ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ on the basis
of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. Therefore, the Convention does not normally apply to the situation of
persons displaced across borders by disasters and climate change and there are at present
no widely accepted principles or rules governing their entry and stay in another country.”).
53 Well beyond the scope of this Article, this notion of economic mobility deserves
to be challenged within the refugee framework, as in some societies economic mobility is
illusory at best, and there is an overwhelming likelihood of people who are born into
poverty remaining in poverty. See Clionadh Raleigh, Assessing the Impact of Climate
Change on Migration and Conflict 38 (Social Dev. Dep’t, The World Bank Grp., Working
Paper) (highlighting that “both internal and international migration is an initial economic
strain on rural families,” which suggests the financial difficulty in migration).
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the particular social group of “women” would be sufficient (without
considering the nexus requirement, to which this Article turns
momentarily).54 The point here is to realize that the social affinity
of facing this challenge collectively in some sub-group of a nation’s
population will not be enough.
Once a protected characteristic is identified, a separate issue
then arises: nexus, or the need to prove that the feared harm would
happen because of that protected characteristic.55 This will be
possible in certain contexts where government policies explicitly
target communities or groups. Examples include if one ethnicity is
forbidden to leave unusable land (like the Bantustan policies in
apartheid-era South Africa),56 or if fiscal resources for adaptation
deliberately exclude portions of the population because of their
political opinions, race, or other protected characteristic.57 The New
Zealand Supreme Court, while denying a particular applicant’s
refugee claim, left that possibility open:
[W]e note that both the Tribunal and the High Court, emphasized
their decisions did not mean that environmental degradation
resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could
never create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected
person jurisdiction. Our decision in this case should not be taken
as ruling out that possibility in an appropriate case.58

54 See Chaloka Beyani, The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human-Rights Perspective,
3 GENDER & DEV. 29, 31 (1995) (“It is well known that the definition of refugees contained
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees omits the category of sex as a
ground upon which refugee status may be determined. As a consequence of this omission,
the claim of women to be protected from persecution on the basis of their sex or gender
cannot be adequately addressed within the framework of the Convention, which is the main
instrument governing the protection of refugees in international law.”).
55 See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i)
(2012).
56 Omar Sattaur, How Apartheid is Destroying South Africa’s Environment, NEW
SCIENTIST (May 12, 1990), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12617160-700-howapartheid-is-destroying-south-africas-environment/ [https://perma.cc/PH56-E4DE] (“The
Bantustans were fragile initially with thin topsoil, scarce rainfall and sloping, rocky
ground. Now, politically enforced overpopulation, labour scarcity and poverty have made
many of the homelands look more like lunar landscapes than rural communities[.]”).
57 Teitiota v. Chief Executive Ministry of Business, Innovation & Emp. [2015]
NZSC 107, at 13 (N.Z.).
58 Id.
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Another New Zealand Tribunal acknowledged in the AF case that
nexus could be possible, but denied a claim because of insufficient
facts in the particular case:
While there is no presumption of non-applicability [of Refugee
Protection to the climate-change context], no special rules exist
either. It is indubitably correct that natural disasters and
environmental degradation can involve significant human rights
issues. Nevertheless . . . the claimant must still establish that they
meet the legal criteria set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention (or, for that matter, the relevant legal standards in the
protected person jurisdiction). This involves an assessment not
simply of whether there has been breach of a human right in the
past, but the assessment of a future risk of being persecuted. In
the New Zealand context, the claimant’s predicament must
establish a real chance of a sustained or systemic violation of a
core human right demonstrative of a failure of state protection
which has sufficient nexus to a Convention ground.59

Thus, future cases may provide sufficient factual bases between
harms feared and a protected ground under the Refugee Convention,
but they will need to be determined on an individualized basis, like
the vast majority of refugee claims.60
And what of policies or harms that are more indirect? To take
one example, it is beyond reasonable dispute that structural racism
explains why African-Americans were more vulnerable to
Hurricane Katrina’s impacts than any other group in New Orleans.61
As a theoretical matter, a strong case can be made that the suffering
that group endured was on account of race. But the complex factors
underpinning the reasons why African-Americans overwhelmingly

AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at 65 (N.Z.).
UNHCR, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement, ¶ 8
(2011), available at https://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5e19.pdf [https://perma.cc/N286-P7ZY]
(“[I]t is clear that the 1951 Convention may apply in specific situations, for instance, where
‘victims of natural disasters flee because their government has consciously withheld or
obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize them on one of five [Convention]
grounds.”).
61 See Reilly Morse, Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina,
JOINT CENTER FOR POL. AND ECON. STUD. HEALTH POL’Y INST. (2008) (discussing how in
New Orleans, “historical patterns of environmental racism” contributed to the
disproportionate impact that Hurricane Katrina had on African-Americans).
59
60
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lived in flood-prone low-lying areas may be too diffuse and indirect
to gain actual protection under the Refugee Convention with its
focus on the risks individuals, not communities, face.62 Likewise, if
we found that women suffered far more harm than men in a given
country because they had fewer possibilities of relocating internally
(from cultural norms to issues surrounding land-title), would that be
persecution on account of membership in the particular social group
of women? Theoretically, yes, but without a specific action directed
at women because they are women, it would be extremely difficult
for such women to qualify for asylum were they to flee their
countries.63
Asylum law would need to move toward something like the
disparate impact doctrine in U.S. civil rights law, where there is
liability even in cases where the discrimination or animus is
concealed.64 As of now, the doctrine is more analogous to the
intentional discrimination doctrine, where evidence of intent is
required.65 The previously discussed AF Tribunal decision
emphasized the necessity of such an individualized showing by
holding that the appellant’s facts did not link the climate
degradation of Kiribati to a particular risk of persecution he
personally faced.66 The Tribunal noted that conflicts related to
environmental degradation exist in Kiribati, but stated that in this
instance, “the appellant himself had not been subjected to any such
dispute in the past and is not involved in any land dispute.”67
3. The Impossible Cases: Where No Protected Ground Is
Claimed
Some claims for refugee protection have been brought where the
harm is to an entire population, not to a protected sub-group within
See Refugee Convention, supra note 3.
See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 45, at ¶ 14.
64 Antonelli v. N.J., 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Intentional discrimination
can be shown when: (1) a law or policy explicitly classifies citizens on the basis of race;
(2) a facially neutral law or policy is applied differently on the basis of race; or (3) a facially
neutral law or policy that is applied evenhandedly is motivated by discriminatory intent
and has a racially discriminatory impact.”) (citations omitted).
65 See Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 543 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).
66 See AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at 72 (N.Z.).
67 Id.
62
63
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the population; however, those claims have failed.68 In claims heard
in New Zealand, migrants from Kirabati’s neighbor, Tuvalu,
asserted that “[e]xposure to the sea along the coastline makes land
erosion a serious problem and the country suffers from rising sea
levels, storms and king tides. They believe that life will no longer
be sustainable on Tuvalu because of rising sea levels.”69 While
finding that the Tuvalu appellant would suffer harm in Tuvalu, the
Court held that “there is no basis for finding that any harm they do
face as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change has any
nexus whatsoever to any one of the five Convention grounds.”70 For
nations where the entire population is equally harmed by climate
change, the Refugee Convention will simply be the wrong
mechanism for seeking refuge.71 This assessment might differ in a
region like Africa or Latin America that has embraced a broader
definition of refugee72—but under the Refugee Convention itself,
claims that do not fit within the five protected categories simply do
not fall within the Convention’s protections.
IV. Why Precision Matters
With application of any convention, statute, or regulation to an
individual case, precision and care clearly matter, and the Refugee
Convention is no different. But in the turbulent international and
domestic contexts of the early-to-mid 21st century, precision matters
to the enduring power and availability of the Convention itself.
There is no question that the Refugee Convention and its core
obligation of nonrefoulement are under tremendous pressure and,
often, under attack.73 As racist “nationalist” movements move from
See id.
Gill Bonnet, Climate change refugee cases rejected, RADIO N.Z. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/342280/climate-change-refugee-cases-rejected
[https://perma.cc/5AZR-68PD].
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 See id.
72 See UNHCR, Expert roundtable Interpretation of the extended refugee definition
contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Part B, (July 7, 2014)
[hereinafter UNHCR, Expert roundtable interpretation] (expanding the definition of
refugee to include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order”).
73 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and
Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 86 (2015) (“The Refugee
68
69
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the political fringes to the political mainstream from the United
States to Germany and beyond, anti-refugee rhetoric has provided a
reliable source of political power and mobilization.74 Donald
Trump came to power in the United States in part by stoking the
fears of an immigrant invasion; his attacks on asylum-seekers in
particular have been constant and go beyond rhetoric to actual
policies dismantling the Convention’s applicability.75 Angela
Merkel’s relative generosity toward Syrian refugees weakened her
politically and led to the rise of far-right Alternative for Germany.76
Anti-asylum fervor has stoked racist political movements in
countries from Austria to Sweden, from France to Poland.77
In such a context, where even the relatively narrow existing
framework is under intense stress, using the word “refugee” to
encompass all climate-change migrants feeds the dangerous
perception that the world can no longer afford the Refugee
Convention. That the numbers seeking its protections are simply
too big. In the face of problems that seem overwhelming, too many
countries have the capacity to simply retreat from handling those
problems. In the United Kingdom, fears of being submerged by
migrants played heavily in the referendum to withdraw from the
European Union; the issue was never framed as straying from the
Refugee Convention, but rather limiting the United Kingdom’s
exposure to its obligations by making it more difficult for possible
asylum-seekers to arrive in the first place.78 Likewise, in the United
States, nominal claims of commitment to the Convention co-exist
with strenuous deterrent measures to limit the United States’

Convention has spent much of its adult life under attack in both developed and developing
countries.”).
74 See generally Elaina Marie Taylor, The Effects of Political Rhetoric on Refugee
Policy and Communities in the United States and Germany, EL RIO: A STUDENT RES. J.
50–51 (2018) (analyzing the United States and Germany’s changes in refugee policy and
refugee political rhetoric over the last decade).
75 See id. at 51–53.
76 Id. at 53–54.
77 See Daniel McLaughlin, Poles and Czechs Follow Austria and Hungary in
Rejecting
UN
Migration
Pact,
IRISH
TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/poles-and-czechs-follow-austria-andhungary-in-rejecting-un-migration-pact-1.3684210 [https://perma.cc/MN4T-RX56].
78 See Alan Travis, On Asylum and Refugees, Britain Left Europe Years Ago,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/01/howbritain-hard-stance-refugees-reshaping-european-policy [https://perma.cc/F4VA-Q38K].
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obligations.79 The United States has made entry extremely difficult,
adding tremendous costs (from criminal prosecution to family
separation) during the screening process and making the interior
less welcoming as well.80 The United States can thus limit the
Convention while conceding its continued existence.
There is much to critique in deterrent strategies—from their
questionable legality to their misreading of the enduring power of
the reasons people flee their countries for safety elsewhere. And
yet, when we contemplate the subset of climate-change migrants
fleeing because of the literal unavailability of land, it should be
clear, even to those who favor deterrence currently, that such a
strategy has no bearing on these future migrants.81 People may be
deterred from seeking entry into the United States specifically, but
deterring them from leaving their home countries is clearly
impossible as those countries degrade and, in extreme cases,
disappear.82 If deterrence is impossible, but migrants and advocates
believe they may seek Convention protections, states’ willingness
to abide by the Convention—even in its current weakened state—
may disappear entirely.83
79 See An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept.
17, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugeelaw-and-policy [https://perma.cc/QE3Y-HZ9N] (“The prospects for refugees hoping to
resettle in the United States changed abruptly in 2017 . . . . [T]he Trump administration
suspended indefinitely the entry of Syrian refugees into the country and lowered the FY
2017 refugee admissions ceiling from 110,000 (set under the Obama administration) to
50,000.”).
80 See generally SARAH PIERCE, JESSICA BOLTER, & ANDREW SELEE, TRUMP’S FIRST
YEAR ON IMMIGRATION POLICY: RHETORIC VS. REALITY 1 (Migration Policy Inst. ed., 2018)
(“The most significant changes to date are the increase and broadening of immigration
enforcement priorities, the elimination of temporary protections for noncitizens
implemented by prior administrations, and the reduction in refugee admissions.”).
81 See EMILY WILKINSON, AMY KIRBYSHIRE, LEIGH MAYHEW, PANDORA BATRA &
ANDREA MILAN, CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT: CLOSING THE POLICY
GAP 3 (Overseas Dev. Inst. ed., 2016) (explaining that forced migrants are those who need
to leave their homes to avoid severe deterioration in habitat and resources . . . [t]hese
people may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, or may need to alter
livelihood practices or other aspects of living in order to return”).
82 See id.
83 See Jane McAdam, Seven Reasons the UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include
‘Climate Refugees,’ PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (June 7, 2017),
https://disasterdisplacement.org/staff-member/seven-reasons-the-un-refugee-conventionshould-not-include-climate-refugees [https://perma.cc/TK6T-GWGP] (“Fifth, there is
little political appetite at the moment to expand the Refugee Convention. Opening it up for
renegotiation would most likely result in a far weaker protection framework, with less
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The Convention matters. Its protections are critical. But we
should not ask it to encompass migrants whose profiles do not fit
within its parameters. Doing so may result in weakening
protections for even those who fit under its protections as currently
defined, an outcome that must be avoided. As UNHCR Consultant
Weerasinghe writes, “[r]efugee law frameworks may form part of a
‘toolbox’ of options, when multiple frameworks are available to
provide international protection. When only one framework
(refugee, migration, other) is operational, the potential to tailor
appropriate and differentiated international protection responses is
constrained.”84 The Convention has a vital place in international
law, but we need other legal frameworks that fit climate change
migration specifically, so that we can ensure the long-term survival
of the Convention. The next section turns to these ideas.
V. Unconventional Refugees: When Precision Is Not Enough
“We can park our chair on the beach as often as we please, and
cry at the oncoming waves, but the tide will not listen, nor the sea
retreat.”85
This Article has so far issued a call to not overly rely on a
refugee convention whose contours are only sometimes applicable
to climate-change migration and to find those moments where
people do fit within its protections. I have recognized that calling
climate-change migrants “refugees” has dangerous unintended
consequences and usurps tremendous energy in trying to shoehorn
populations of migrants into a legal regime not designed for that
purpose. As Professor Ramji Nogales has written, “[l]awyers and
the broader public engage in arguments about whether these
migrants fit within the murky legal definition of a particular social
group rather than engaging in discussion concerning far more
important questions about who should be able to migrate globally
and why.”86 As the quote from Robert Winder above suggests, we
do indeed face an unavoidable new series of forced migrations
caused by climate change, and as the seas literally will not retreat,
protection for all – including those it currently protects.”).
84 Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 8.
85 ZYGMUNT BAUMUN, STRANGERS AT OUR DOOR 5 (2016) (quoting ROBERT WINDER,
BLOODY FOREIGNERS: THE STORY OF IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN xiii (2013)).
86 Ramji-Nogales, supra note 12, at 614–15.
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we must craft responses appropriate to the challenge.
A. Why: The Idea of Duty
In other work, I have discussed philosophical justifications for
responding to the challenge, largely grounded in a “weak
cosmopolitanism,” which forms a middle ground between the stateprimacy approach of Michael Walzer and the open borders position
of Joseph Carens.87 Weak cosmopolitanism concedes that there are
special duties we owe to our fellow citizens, but recognizes that we
may also have duties to non-citizens, including to forced migrants.88
One source of duty particularly relevant to the climate-change
context is the role of the receiving state in creating the harm that
individuals are fleeing. The countries with the most significant or
dramatic migrations forced by climate change (e.g. Pacific Island or
Sahelian nations) are not the countries responsible for global
warming,89 which is largely driven by the production of greenhouse
gases.90 Where industrialized countries like China and the United
States bear a far greater share of the underlying causes of climatechange migration, political philosophers articulate a justification for
them to likewise bear a far greater share of providing redress to the
affected populations.91
87 See generally Keyes, supra note 13, at 30–45 (“There is a range between
immigration control that denies all rights and completely open borders with strong
incentives for migration. This Article adopts such a position: a pragmatic understanding
of the significance of borders, with limitations on the power of immigration control to deny
fundamental rights. The middle ground between bounded justice and open borders is
sometimes labeled moderate or weak cosmopolitanism.”).
88 Id. at 34 (“Acknowledging that we are citizens of both our nations and the world,
this philosophy privileges duties owed to co-nationals, but recognizes a lesser set of duties
that may yet be owed to non-nationals, such as these forced migrants.”).
89 See Johannes Friedrich, Mengpin Ge & Andrew Pickens, This Interactive Chart
Explains World’s Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed, WORLD RES. INST. (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-top-10emitters-and-how-theyve-changed [https://perma.cc/9VQP-5KUR] (naming the Top Ten
Emitters of Greenhouse Gases: China, United States, European Union, India, Russia,
Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, Canada, and Mexico).
90 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
SUMMARY
FOR
POLICYMAKERS
2
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7X8D-JMLN] (“Human influence on the climate system is clear, and
recent anthropogenic emissions of green-house gases are the highest in history. Recent
climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.”).
91 See Bayes Ahmed, Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?, 10 INT’L
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A “global harm principle,” laid out by philosopher Shelley
Wilcox, identifies a duty to compensate those individuals or groups
harmed by the state’s actions92 and makes such people a priority for
admissions under the state’s immigration mechanisms.93 Writing
about refugees specifically, Joseph Carens, the most famous
proponent of open borders,94 urges that those who disagree with his
conclusions recognize this duty: “Sometimes we have an obligation
to admit refugees because the actions of our own state have
contributed in some way to the fact that the refugees are no longer
safe in their home country.”95
The United States has historically recognized such duties in
limited circumstances. The United States welcome of Vietnamese
refugees sprang from a recognition of the vulnerability these
refugees faced as the United States decided to withdraw militarily
from Vietnam.96 In the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia, U.S. testing of nuclear weapons brought environmental
destruction to the Islands.97 As a result,98 the United States signed a
J. OF CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES AND MGMT. 5, 19–20 (2018) (“When only 62
billionaires have more combined wealth than the bottom half of the world population, only
10 countries are producing 69 per cent of the world’s total of carbon dioxide, and these
countries are consuming most of the world’s resources and consequently generating more
wastes, then the least developed and world’s poorest countries carry the burden of the
polluters in the form of climate-change impacts . . . . [T]he liable or climate polluting
countries should pay for the victim country’s recovery to bring climate justice.”).
92 Jared Keyel, Responsibility to Redress: Global Harm, Obligation and the Afghan
and Iraqi Refugee Crises, 5 SPECTRA 2 (2016) (clarifying that the state conduct must have
been a “critically necessary causal factor” in the harm).
93 Id.
94 Joseph H. Carens, The Case for Open Borders, OPEN DEMOCRACY (2015),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/joseph-h-carens/case-for-open-borders
[https://perma.cc/LE9T-VV6P].
95 JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 195 (2013).
96 Max Boot, Trump’s Plan to Deport Vietnamese Refugees Betrays a Sacred
American
Principle,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
2,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-plan-to-deportvietnamese-refugees-betrays-a-sacred-american-principle/2019/01/02/6cd00c84-0eac11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html?utm_term=.7696667ea936 [https://perma.cc/4EN26DT7] (“The United States establishes a sacred bond with allied states when U.S. troops
shed blood alongside their own. Deporting Vietnamese refugees would be another betrayal
of South Vietnam and of America’s own Vietnam veterans.”).
97 Robert Alvarez, The Legacy of U.S. nuclear Testing in the Marshall Islands,
HUFFINGTON POST (2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-alvarez/the-legacy-ofus-nuclear_b_586524.html [https://perma.cc/4LYK-NAJ4].
98 Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Marsh. Is., Art. VII §177, Apr. 30, 2003,
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Compact of Free Association99 with the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (and a separate one with the Federated States of
Micronesia).100 Under the Compact’s terms, Marshall Islanders who
are otherwise admissible101 to the United States can travel freely to
the United States, but only in “nonimmigrant” status, i.e. not on a
path to lawful permanent residence of citizenship.102 The status
permits them to work lawfully, and if other routes to lawful
permanent residence open up (for example, through marriage to a
U.S. citizen), they are able to adjust their status accordingly.103
B. What: Durable Immigration Status
Unlike contexts where temporary regimes might be adequate to
address the arrival of “unconventional” refugees, such as civil strife
and civil wars that create population exoduses, climate-change
migration demands durable long-lasting solutions.104
When
repatriation is not possible, temporary regimes result in serious
inequities. Here, the experience of Marshall Islanders and
Micronesians in the United States is instructive. As noted above,
the United States made special provisions for their passage to the
United States, but once here, they have only “nonimmigrant” status,
which leaves the Islanders in a perpetual limbo.105 As one
commenter notes in an assessment of the Compact’s immigration
provisions, “if international relocation of a significant number of
[Marshall Islands and Micronesia] citizens becomes necessary, the
T.I.A.S. 04-501 (“The Government of the United States accepts the responsibility for
compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands, or the Federated States of
Micronesia, (or Palau) for loss or damage to property and person of the citizens of the
Marshall Islands, or the Federated States of Micronesia, resulting from the nuclear testing
program which the Government of the United States conducted in the Northern Marshall
Islands between June 30, 1946, and August 18, 1958.”).
99 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., STATUS OF CITIZENS OF THE FREELY
ASSOCIATED STATES OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
MARSHALL ISLANDS (2015), available at https://www.fsmgov.org/status.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WR9P-RA8].
100 Id.
101 I.N.A § 212 provides a host of reasons to deny admission, including a broad range
of criminal offenses and likelihood of becoming a “public charge.” 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4)
(2018).
102 Compact of Free Association, supra note 98, at art. IV §141(a).
103 Id. at art. IV §141(d), (h).
104 Keyes, supra note 13, at 77.
105 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 99, at 4.
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current immigration provisions in the Compacts would be wholly
inadequate on their own to respond to such a critical situation.”106
Other temporary responses to forced migration have been
regimes aimed at ultimately repatriating the migrants. In the United
States, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) exists for those already in
the country who are unable to return home due to civil conflict or
natural disasters.107 TPS comes with work authorization, but lacks
other features of immigration mechanisms with goals of
integration—the goal of TPS is intentionally the opposite, even
though people may stay many years, even decades, with TPS when
conditions in the countries of origin do not improve.108 Likewise,
despite the ability to offer broader forms of refugee protection under
its domestic law incorporation of the Cartagena Declaration,
Mexico processed many Haitian migrants post-earthquake as
temporary one-year visitors authorized to work, but admitted for
humanitarian reasons and not as refugees.109
Temporary frameworks may be of use in certain kinds of
climate-driven migration. As Professor Martin notes, “[i]n both
slow onset and acute cases, movement may be temporary, cyclical
or permanent. The decision as to whether return is possible involves
a range of variables, including the extent to which the
environmental causes – either direct or through other channels–is
likely to persist or frequently reoccur.”110 In cases where the
displacement is temporary or cyclical, TPS-style mechanisms may
be appropriate.111 However, we also know from the outset that in
many instances, repatriation cannot be the goal or orientation of the
program, which argues strongly against a TPS-style mechanism for
those migrants for whom the migration will be permanent.112
As noted above, African and Latin American nations have

106 Briana Dema, Sea Level Rise and the Freely Associated States: Addressing
Environmental Migration under the Compacts of Free Association, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 177, 201 (2012).
107 See Keyes, supra note 13, at 19–21 (describing framework of Temporary Protected
Status program).
108 See generally id. at 19–25 (providing background information on Temporary
Protected Status such as eligibility requirements, critiques, and proposed changes).
109 Weerasinghe, supra note 4, at 77–78.
110 See Martin, supra note 6, at 192.
111 See id.
112 See Keyes, supra note 13, at 24–25.
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committed to more expansive refugee frameworks that could afford
durable protection to climate-change migrants.113 Within Europe,
both Sweden and Finland offer protections specifically linked to
environmental issues.114
Sweden’s asylum system permits
individualized protection to applicants who cannot return to their
countries of origin “because of an environmental disaster.”115
Finland offers something similar, for those whose “need for
protection” is “because of an . . . environmental disaster.”116 While
New Zealand—which has been denying climate-related claims
under its refugee framework—contemplated an environmental
refugee visa, it ultimately rejected that plan.117
The international community is grappling with such alternatives
in various ways, many largely focused on sharing and encouraging
state-level approaches, as opposed to generating a new Convention
or Protocol. Professor Martin provides a comprehensive view of
these approaches in her writing, including the Cancun Adaptation
Framework which considers the three kinds of climate-change
migration, and the complex responses required for each,118 and the
Nansen Initiative.119 The Nansen Initiative has encouraged states to
consider complementary protection regimes in light of climate
change, in part by uncovering practices from around the world “that
complement refugee and other humanitarian protection regimes in
use by countries in protecting those who are displaced by natural
disasters and other forms of environmental change.”120 The third
framework Professor Martin assesses is the Migrants in Countries
See UNHCR, Expert roundtable interpretation, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 6–7.
Martin, supra note 6, at 199.
115 Id. at 199–200 (quoting Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 4 § 2 (Swed.) (2006)).
116 Id. (quoting Aliens Act, Act No. 301/2004, amendments up to 1152/2010 included,
39 (Fin)).
117 AFP, New Zealand Cools on Climate Refugee Plan, NEWS24 (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.news24.com/Green/News/new-zealand-cools-on-climate-refugee-plan20180316 [https://perma.cc/JFW5-MNGC].
118 Martin, supra note 6, at 192–93. Responses include: (1) voluntary migration
(migration seeking to avoid the risks associated with anticipated climate change), (2)
displacement (following acute events like hurricanes or typhoons), and (3) planned
relocation. Id. at 193. Planned relocation may help those in areas likely to experience major
environmental problems to leave before those problems become dire: “individuals and
households who are unable or unwilling to leave even in the face of life-threatening
situations.” Id. at 192.
119 See id. at 204–09 (describing the history and workings of Nansen Initiative).
120 Id. at 206.
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in Crisis (MCIC) framework, which created guidelines and
catalogued practices in a similar way to the Nansen Initiative, but
led by the most affected countries themselves.121
Climate-change migration has the possibility of opening up new
ways of thinking about forced migrations. Unusual in humanitarian
frameworks, there is a solidarity among countries, as many are
grappling with internal climate-change migration and adaptation.
As we consider how to absorb migrants from regions and nations
whose inhabitability is in sharp and rapid decline, we can think
about the post-Katrina experience in the United States, where
migrants who could not return to New Orleans integrated into
communities like Houston without creating massive localized
distress (beyond short-term emergency responses).122 After decades
of seeing the refugee framework as divided between countries
“creating” or sending the refugees, and countries receiving the
refugees, this shared experience marks a profound change.
That change has not yet resulted in widespread popular
discourse about the duties owed to climate-change migrants.
Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Maldives, being the most immediately
impacted, have been vocal, demanding, and creative about urging
that discourse.123 Countries like New Zealand, Sweden, and Finland
are responding.124 It is beyond time for the countries most
responsible for climate change to join these conversations and
create immigration mechanisms that respond to the coming
migrations.

See id. at 209–11.
122 AUDREY SINGER & WILLIAM H. FREY, KATRINA AND RITA IMPACTS ON GULF COAST
POPULATIONS: FIRST CENSUS FINDINGS 1 (Brookings ed., 2006) (“This analysis provides a
“baseline” portrait of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on population shifts and
changing characteristics in the Gulf Region in the immediate months after the storms hit”);
see “New Orleans West”: Houston is Home for Many Evacuees 10 Years After Katrina,
GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/25/new-orleans-westhouston-hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/4VJB-6UMQ].
123 See Martin, supra note 6, at 200.
124 See id. at 199–200.
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